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Introduction 
In his work over the last thirty years, 
the philosopher Daniel Dennett has 
articulated a philosophical attitude, the 
intentional stance, in hopes of providing a 
firm foundation for research efforts in the 
interdisciplinary field of inquiry known as 
cognitive science. Falling under the 
umbrella of cognitive science are those 
areas of computer science, linguistics, 
philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and 
neuroscience that, naively put, assume, in 
various shapes and forms, that the human 
brain is a computer and that the subjective 
"mind" is a function of this physical 
machine. Various computational models of 
consciousness based on this assumption 
have been put forward in the past quarter 
century - and, troubling enough, none 
have yet to produce any program or 
machine with results remotely resembling 
human consciousness. 
A major stumbling block in the 
formative years of cognitive science was 
recognizing and defining the key element 
necessary for producing an artificially 
intelligent machine - namely, 
consciousness. What is consciousness? 
What are the defining features, after all, of 
this sentience that accompanies "cognitive 
processing" (e.g., the mental addition of 
numbers, pattern recognition, etc.)? These 
considerations become especially 
problematic when one asks - "How do I 
know that your experiences are (generally) 
the same as mine?" Pushing this question 
even further, one is then forced to ask how 
criteria established from the perspective of 
the first-person can be generalized in a way 
that can be utilized by an objective science 
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of consciousness. Thus, researchers in 
cognitive science soon found themselves 
turning to philosophers, who have been 
debating these deeper questions for some 
time now, for answers to the tough 
questions of the being of consciousness -
in hopes that they would be provided 
with a workable model and method to 
use for overcoming the enigmatic nature 
of consciousness. 
The intentional stance proposed by 
Dennett is necessary to clear the way for 
one such coupling of model and method. 
By this stance, Dennett suggests that in 
ordinary everyday life we treat others (the 
subject in our experiments and research) as 
intentional systems; "that is, as entities 
whose behavior can be predicted by the 
method of attributing beliefs, desires, and 
rational acumen" under the assumption that 
the other is rational like one's self (Stance 
49). This stance is proposed as an 
alternative to the traditional, Cartesian, 
dualistic conception of mind and body that 
permeates common assumptions about the 
nature of self-consciousness, the soul, and 
the body. "Heterophenomenology" is a 
method, based upon this behavioristic 
stance, that Dennett contends transcends 
the limitations of common-sense 
assumptions to support a computational 
model of consciousness. 
Heterophenomenology downplays 
the reality of the internal experiential 
aspects of consciousness in deference 
to an intentional, language-based model 
of consciousness that places emphasis 
on the neutral acceptance of the speech 
reports of subjects as the basis for 
understanding consciousness - thus 
placing the foundations of consciousness 
in a physical, monistic (physical sans 
soul), computational device (the brain). 
I shall argue that this methodology can be 
seen as a form of empathic extrapolation 
of self-understanding onto the other in 
dialogue, akin to the work of early 
hermeneutics. 11 This methodology is 
closely tied in with a contemporary 
connectionist conception of computability 
that Dennett develops in his book 
Consciousness Explained. 
This essay has three major parts: 
heterophenomenology, hermeneutics, and 
implications of hermeneutics for 
heterophenomenology - the first two-
thirds being, for the purposes of contrast 
and comparison, mainly exegetical. I will 
initially be concerned with developing 
more fully not only an account of Dennett's 
heterophenomenology but also the 
background that gave rise to it. I will also 
explore in this part the relationship between 
Dennett's notion of phenomenology and 
intentionality and the account of 
intentionality developed by Edmund 
Husserl in his Logical Investigations . This 
will be necessary to draw the external 
critique of heterophenomenology as method 
developed in the second part of this essay 
and Dennett's model closer together for the 
sake of highlighting their common ancestry. 
I will next bring into question the notion of 
method in the human sciences by 
examining a strain of philosophical thought, 
which, at first glance, seems completely 
foreign to the concerns of cognitive 
science. Hermeneutics is the philological / 
philosophical tradition concerned with the 
proper interpretation and understanding of 
the voice of the other in dialogue and texts. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics, as 
developed in his work Truth and Method, 
serves as a vehicle to bring into question 
the methods and goals of science and the 
subject / object dichotomy upon which they 
are based. Working through Gadamer's 
relationship, via Martin Heidegger, to 
Husserl's phenomenology, I will bring to 
light, contra understanding as instrumental 
empathic transposition in 
heterophenomenology, a competing view of 
dialogue founded in the sustained, mutual 
agreement of interlocutors. The 
hermeneutic vision of language as mutual 
agreement developed in this section of the 
project will be informed and directed by the 
contemporary critical-hermeneutic work of 
Hans-Herbert Kogler. 
I will close with a consideration of the 
implications of hermeneutics for 
heterophenomenology and similar research 
efforts in cognitive science. Although it is 
my main goal to articulate a view of 
cognitive science and artificial intelligence 
from a hermeneutically sensitive position, I 
will attempt to develop some of the 
ramifications of careless objectification in 
the human sciences. When we objectify our 
fellow humans in research under the object 
/ subject dichotomy, we place significant 
dialogue in a precarious position. By 
treating the other in dialogue as an object, 
available for manipUlation and domination 
(via the scientific method), we run the risk 
of alienation and termination of any fruitful 
dialogue that may lead to a deeper 
understanding of the nature of being 
and consciousness, and of the relationship 
of the self to language and other agents. 
In conclusion, I will consider the bearing 
of this impasse for future studies in 
cognitive science. 
Husserl and Dennett: 
Heterophenomenology as Method 
Husserl's Proposal 
We begin our study by developing a 
conception of intentionality vis-a-vis the 
transcendental phenomenology of Edmund 
Husserl. In an attempt to avoid what he 
considers the naiVete of objectivism in 
psychologism and the "positivistic" 
sciences, Husserl grounds knowledge (in 
the tradition of Kant but against the 
shortcomings of the "forms of knowledge" 
of the neo-Kantians) in a transcendental 
subjectivity not unlike Descartes' cogito; 
i.e., the cogito posited to serve as the basis 
for an eradication of deception in the 
material world. Because of the rich 
structure of transcendental subjectivity 
developed in Husserl's writings, it is easy 
to lose oneself in exegesis. Nevertheless, it 
will be instructive for us to understand 
more fully Husserl's motivation for this 
attempt, both as a contrast to Dennett's 
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understanding of intentionality and as the 
framework in which Heidegger and 
Gadamer after him worked and struggled. 
When we come to grasp the full import of 
this project, however, we will see that 
Husserl's equation of meaning with the 
noetic bed of phenomenological being leads 
inevitably to a solipsistic idealism that 
makes a return to the world (the life-world 
of sensile hyle which was supposed to 
support an ego-centric investigation of 
intentionality) impossible (in contrast to the 
Cartesian cogito) (Ideas §85, 227-230). To 
this end, I will, after a brief outline of 
Husserl's project, take a look at two 
peculiar aspects, or rather symptomatic 
results, of phenomenological reduction 
(epoche) which lead to the untenable nature 
of a "scientific" study of intentionality -
namely, the alienation of self from 
community and the desire to found 
knowledge as constitutive of this loss. 
The "crisis" of the western mind that 
Husserl speaks of in his Vienna Lecture is, 
in a sense, real. The trend towards 
objectification (that is, the striving towards 
an explicating methodology in the human 
sciences that has marked the progress of 
our intellect since the "Enlightenment") has 
necessarily neglected both the qualitative 
(ineffable) aspects of subjectivity that are 
the hallmarks of consciousness (in the 
natural sciences and philosophy of 
language post-Frege) and the life-world 
background that orients us towards just 
these notions of objectivity and subjectivity 
(in the dialogue stemming from 
transcendental phenomenology). I say 
"necessarily" because science deals only 
with intersubjective experience -
experience that relies upon language and 
the conceptualizing power of speech -
communication with other humans in an 
attempt to deal with each other and 
interactions with a natural world. Science 
can be criticized for trivializing or denying 
the existence of the individualistic and 
historically situated aspects of experience 
in striving for objectivity. 
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Coupled with a Western teleology of 
reason, exemplified in Hegel's 
understanding of absolute being, this 
objectifying spirit leads in various paths to 
foundationally oriented structures of 
experience and understanding that appear 
on further analysis to merely buttress the 
deep seated beliefs of our culture against 
views on the periphery of our objective 
gaze. 12 The answer, Husserl maintains, 
is to tum altogether from this naturalization 
of spirit that science advocates to a new, 
purified science of intentional analysis -
for "no objective science can do justice 
to the [very] subjectivity which 
accomplishes science" (10). 
To found knowledge, in hopes of 
establishing a "science of consciousness", 
Husserl must find a bedrock upon which 
his science may be stabilized. His initial 
step is to differentiate between a "natural 
standpoint" and a more fundamental state 
of "Being" (Ideas §32). The natural 
standpoint is the practical one within which 
we operate on a daily basis as we attend to 
the affairs of non-philosophizing be-ing (to 
foreshadow our Heideggarian exploration 
of hermeneutics). It is the natural thesis that 
we presuppose for every act we commit in 
the community - the stance we take 
towards the world we find about us (§28). 
He proposes that we bracket the natural 
standpoint of spatio-temporal existence 
(setting aside the facticity of Dasein) -
a suspension of belief rather than 
hyperbolic doubt - to get to the basis of 
the being of consciousness: 
Consciousness in itself has a being of its 
own which in its absolute uniqueness of 
nature remains unaffected by the 
phenomenological disconnexion. It therefore 
remains over as a "phenomenological 
residuum," as a region of Being which is in 
principle unique, and can become in fact the 
field of a new science - the science of 
phenomenology. (§33) 
By returning our attention to the 
"essence" of consciousness, this epoche of 
the natural thesis will hopefully allow us to 
avoid the trivialization of spirit that occurs 
when we place all our focus on the natural 
world (§34). 
When we deal with "pure" phenomena 
as presented to the self when we turn our 
gaze inwards, we no longer presuppose or 
concern ourselves with or even have 
recourse to the objective-external referents 
of intentionality - we loose certainty, in 
the end, of the things in themselves which 
our thoughts necessarily depend upon to be 
intentional (be conscious of) - the 
fundamental relationship between the 
cogito and its cogitatum. I3 With this loss, 
however, we open the possibility of 
studying the pure meaning-bestowing 
relationship that holds between pure ego 
and its sphere of pure experience 
(Erlebnisse) (Ideas §33). The "being" of 
consciousness has as its essence the 
intentional relationship, and this essence 
becomes the focus of phenomenology.14 
Immediately one asks - "what become of 
the 'others' out-there that form the 
community we are part of, those other 
subjects that exist in the social world we 
bracketed in the phenomenological 
epoche?" They cannot escape the reduction; 
they cannot serve in our search for a 
"science of consciousness". This paints a 
lonely, desolate, and truly antiseptic picture 
of the individual ego searching for 
foundations, floating out beyond the 
community. Are the others, in a sense, 
encompassed by the master-self as acts of 
idealistic instantiation? Husserl seems to 
notice this problem early on, yet does not 
recognize the significance of this solipsism: 
Despite all this [the possible 
contradiction of "others"], we come to 
understandings with our neighbors, and set 
up in common an objective spatio-temporal 
fact-world as the world about us that is 
there for us all, and to which we ourselves 
nonetheless belong. (§29) 
This is quite a leap of faith to take. 
How do we "set up in common" the natural 
world? By Husserl's own admission, the 
strictness of "science" allows for empathy 
and acknowledgment of an other as merely 
representative activities of the ego (Ideas 
§42). Yet, the bogey of solipsism, he 
maintains, is merely an illusion - a 
transcendental illusion that can be dispelled 
with a pinch of faith (Formal and 
Transcendental Logic §96.b). Again in 
Phenomenology: 
The reductive method is transferred 
from self-experience to the experience of 
others insofar as there can be applied to the 
envisaged mental life of the Other the 
corresponding bracketing and description 
according to the subjective 'How' of its 
appearance and what is appearing ... thus 
results the perfect expansion of the genuine 
psychological concept of 'inner experience' 
... the reduced intersubjectivity, in pure 
form and concretely grasped, is a 
community of pure 'persons' acting in the 
intersubjective realm of the pure life of 
consciousness ... (18-19) 
This, too, seems questionable. How 
can we apply/expand 'inner experience' to 
the Other without presupposing the 
supremacy of Self? To understand otherness 
in the study of the transcendental ego as 
absolute subjectivity, the Other in dialogue 
becomes first and foremost alien - a non-
ego that only through painful admission 
becomes an alter-ego. 15 When the smoke 
clears, we see that: 
As this absolute ego, considering 
myself henceforth as my exclusive thematic 
field, I carry on all my further sense-
investigations ... I reflect upon what I can 
find purely "in" myself ... I separate that 
which is primordially my own and that 
which is constituted in me at different 
levels as something "alien": that which is 
constituted, in me, as real or ideal; 
constituted, in me, as Nature, as 
psychophysical being, as a human 
community, as a people or as a state, as 
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reified culture, as science, ... by the effort 
of my own thinking. (Formal and 
Transcendental Logic § 104) 
Can the Other become a personal 
fiction? Surely not - how do we speak of 
otherness in the first place? Yet, on this 
account it surely seems so. Or is this 
troublesome route to community merely the 
by-product of a failed attempt to found 
knowledge in the Self? 
This suggests the second peculiarity I 
would like to touch upon before we move 
on to Dennett's heterophenomenology-
namely, Husserl's lack of rigorous self-
criticism of the presupposition of the 
cogitator / cogitatum distinction necessary 
to undertake the phenomenological epoche 
which, in the final analysis, points to the 
constructive nature of pure ego. He does 
not consider critically approaching his own 
understanding of "self' as a socially 
organized and acquired conception (which 
can fundamentally motivate his very 
inquiry ).16 In light of the intentional 
relationship between pure ego and its 
representational constructions that makes 
the epoche possible, a void opens between 
the "self' and other - a void that seems to 
be incommensurable. How can he be 
certain of the concreteness, so to speak, of 
the "self as subject" as the firm basis for 
the intersubjective transcendence of 
consciousness? Cannot our conception of 
an autonomous "self' be a socially, 
culturally, and historically situated, given, 
and directed one? At this point, we can 
criticize Husserl for taking this conception 
("self' as an a priori - "necessary" truth) 
for granted without considering the 
relationship of subject to community. 
Later, we shall see worked out in 
Gadamer's hermeneutics not only a 
response to just these questions but also a 
consideration of the bearing of 
hermeneutics on any methodological 
explication of being and consciousness. 
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Dennett's Proposal 
As we move our discussion to the 
contemporary reflections of Daniel Dennett 
found in his books The Intentional Stance 
and Consciousness Explained, we must 
reorient ourselves to accommodate a new 
set of concepts and new understanding of 
the problems of consciousness. Although it 
will initially help to view his instrumental 
view of phenomenological research within 
the Husserlian framework originating in 
modem Cartesian philosophy, we must 
eventually overcome a century's difference 
in development and reconfiguration that 
informs Dennett. In this section I will 
recapitulate the time-lapse between these 
two thinkers while developing an 
understanding of Dennett's methodological 
stance and goal. In the conclusion of this 
essay, I will move to develop a critical 
reevaluation of Dennett's thought through a 
hermeneutic conception of understanding 
and dialogue in the human sciences by 
carving out a space for understanding as a 
mutual discovery between agents of 
significance in a space of historical-cultural 
background oriented self-discovery. 
Following Gottlob Frege, Anglo-
American philosophy concerned itself 
mainly not with questions of intentionality 
and phenomenological structures, but rather 
with those of the supposed logical, 
propositional and sentential structure of 
belief and understanding. This focus on the 
logic of language over the situatedness of 
communication, typified by the early work 
of Wittgenstein, quickly settled into an un-
insightful dead end that eventually led to 
Wittgenstein's rejection of the mathematical 
conceptualization of belief and 
intentionality. This rejection was initiated 
by Wittgenstein's insight that meaning is 
not necessarily oriented always towards 
truth (propositional truth-sentences) -
truth being a key component of any 
positivistic inquiry. Carried through by 
Donald Davidson's work (stemming from 
Willard Quine) on translation (viz., 
translation as correlation of truth-sentences) 
under a principle of charity, a general 
sensitivity developed to a conception of 
speaking as a purely social activity in fonns-
of-life as well as to the interdependency of 
conceptual schemes, under which 
interpretation is always perfonned, and its 
target content-matter. Dennett takes as his 
point of departure Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations and this general 
insight into a practical, instrumental, and 
holistic view of language and belief 
fonnation / actualization (CE 463). 
Dennett likens the bulk of 
contemporary analytic philosophy of 
language to the planetary epicycles studied 
by pre-Copernicans astronomers. We are 
caught up in the quandaries of "qualia" and 
the "intrinsic qualities of inner-life", not 
because of an essential structure of 
consciousness that dictates ontological 
distinctions, but rather because of our use 
of the traditional metaphors inherited from 
epistemological, metaphysical, and 
ontological (eidos oriented) investigations 
that infonn the way we speak of 
consciousness (CE 455). On this account, 
the debates between idealism and dualism 
are moot; Dennett feels that the ways in 
which the metaphors of mind / brain and 
soul/body infonn our talk of "reality" 
effectively halt any progress towards a 
theory of consciousness.17 Instead, we 
should highlight the pragmatic nature of 
dialogue in fonns-of-life. 
Liberated from the constraints of the 
traditional dialogue, Dennett sets himself 
the task of developing a productive method 
of intentional research that coincides more 
closely with the aims of natural science. 
Dennett, desiring to uncover the possibility 
of developing a computer model of 
consciousness, is concerned with how we 
can systematically study "subjective", 
intentional experience - and the basic 
message of several hundred pages of 
analysis amounts to a simple, pragmatic 
justification of naturalized consciousness. 
We begin, on this account, from an 
intentional stance grounded in common 
sense folk psychology, whereby we treat 
the other as rational (from our own notions 
of sense and rationality) and hence highly 
predictable, just as we nonnally do in our 
daily non-philosophical activities in the 
life-world. In this fonnulation, we have a 
theory of mental content that sets aside 
ontological considerations by working 
under a natural ontological attitude; i.e., 
that of the "disinterested" natural scientist; 
i.e., acceptance of the materialistic 
mainstream Western conception of Being. 
Setting aside concerns about physical 
design or implementation, we use this 
stance to fonn a theory of competence -
that is, a theory of what it takes to be an 
intentional system conceived of in holistic, 
instrumentalistic, and nonnative tenns -
"a sort of holistic logical behaviorism" as 
Dennett calls it (Stance 57-58). 
Interpreting the beliefs and belief talk 
of an other is taken to be merely an 
instrumental self-projection of self on to the 
subject - where the other's beliefs are 
taken, with a grain of salt, to be "real" and 
"true" for purely useful, predictive goals 
(72-73). However, Dennett still stresses the 
fact that, under this stance, we do not 
commit ourselves to any metaphysical 
claims and that such "neutral" and arbitrary 
ascription of reality and truth-values is to 
be taken as a strategic maxim rather than as 
a binding epistemological principle (75). 
It is important for this discussion, and 
particularly for understanding Dennett, to 
mention the profound effect evolutionary 
explanations of general phenomena have on 
contemporary discourse. Dennett, as many 
intellectuals are, is enamored with the 
predicative and productive capacities of the 
mathematical-naturalistic sciences. The use 
of Darwin's ideas to "reveal" the "true" 
nature of all social and natural events is 
currently in vogue. Dennett, feeling that the 
inherent practicality of these ideas is in 
tune with his instrumental view of dialogue, 
is eager in his development of a theory of 
consciousness to abide by the dictates of 
evolutionary explanation. 
On the path to a productive theory of 
consciousness, Dennett's primary task is to 
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develop a new methodology for research 
founded on this intentional stance. With a 
Wittgenstein-Davidsonian pragmatic 
understanding of interpretation (reinforced 
with Darwinian tools), he has a fmn footing 
to uncover just what such a method entails. 
What is a believer in this stance? 
[A]ny object - or as I shall say, any 
system - whose behavior is well predicted 
by this strategy [the Intentional Strategy] is 
in the fullest sense of the word a believer. 
What it is to be a true believer is to be an 
intentional system, a system whose 
behavior is reliably and voluminously 
predictable via the intentional strategy [an 
interest relative cross of realism and 
interpretation ism]." (Stance 15, 27) 
In the Heterophenomenological 
method, we approach the verbal, behavioral 
report of a subject on her experiences much 
like an anthropologist would the reports of 
members of another social group in 
investigating their religion. Individuals, 
under this method, are the authors of their 
"fictional worlds" (notional worlds, 
alternatively) of experience, and it is the 
role of the investigator to maintain "a 
constructive and sympathetic neutrality, in 
hopes of compiling a definitive description 
of the world according to the subjects" as 
they record the 'texts' of the authors (CE 
83). These neutrally compiled texts (as 
"theorists '" fictions) allow the investigator 
to interpret the phenomenological world of 
an individual, as reported, as one would 
interpret a novel to be read. "Maximally 
extended, it is a neutral portrayal of exactly 
what it is like to be that subject - in the 
subject's own terms, given the best 
interpretation we can muster" (98). In this 
light, the concept of selfhood and soul are 
"abstractions rather than nuggets of 
mysterious stuff ... they're exquisitely 
useful fictions" (367). 
The heterophenomenologist can now 
turn to the task of developing a naturalistic 
causal account of how these fictions are 
created. Dennett elaborates a detailed 
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computational mechanism, using the latest 
ideas of parallel distributed processing, 
neural networks, and memes, to "explain" 
consciousness in his interesting work 
Consciousness Explained. The details, 
although quite interesting and well 
developed, are of little significance for our 
present essay. 
Auto- vs. Hetero- phenomenology 
At this point I will undertake a more 
direct comparison of Husserl and Dennett. 
Through this, we shall clarify the 
similarities of each and gain an overall 
better understanding of their projects. It 
will be helpful here to adopt Dennett's 
terminology whereby he distances himself 
from traditional phenomenology; an ego-
centric investigator in the Husserlian 
tradition I shall label autophenomenologist; 
the pragmatic scientist I shall term the 
heterophenomenologist. 18 To streamline this 
process further, I will work under four 
headings that will hopefully delineate their 
essential differences: goals, views on 
intentionality, methodology, and attitudes 
towards realism and the life-world. 
Goals. The main contrast between the 
auto and hetero phenomenologists lies in the 
overall aims of each project. For the auto, 
a science of consciousness is sought which 
in the end will support a grand foundation 
for all knowledge. This traditional 
philosophical ideal is immediately evident 
from the start in Husserl's transcendental 
phenomenology. We aim, in this schema, to 
replace previous foundations at hand with 
an ultimate bedrock: 
In opposition to all previously designed 
objective sciences, which are sciences on 
the ground of the world, this would be a 
science of the universal how of the 
pregivenness of the world, i.e., of what 
makes it a universal ground for any sort of 
objectivity. (Crisis §38) 
Unlike those before him, Husserl boldly 
attempted to overhaul our understanding of 
self and the world. Like those before him, 
however, he boldly asserted the supremacy 
of his own culturally acquired 
presuppositions and failed to break with the 
"enlightenment" he criticized and the 
circularity of the dichotomies cherished by 
its method. 
The hetero, on the other hand, tempers 
any yearnings for universality with an 
appeal to pragmatic holism. She seeks an 
"objective" science of consciousness 
supported by her productive method. 
Intentionality. In pure phenomenology, 
the auto investigates the essence of the 
intentional correlation; the 
phenomenological field of experience is 
between an ego-pole and a world-pole and 
therein lies the intentional correlation that 
gives rise to meaning in experience: 
Essential intentionality 
J, 
I-pole <=:::> World-pole 
Thus posited, the auto circumscribes 
any infmite regress by placing the self in 
relationship to the lifeworld, while at the 
same time also negates the significance of 
others in giving supremacy to the 
conscious-ego as meaning giver-endower. 19 
The hetero views this system-building 
as ludicrous. Intentionality is a place-holder 
borrowed from folk psychology (which is 
unfortunately reified/deified by 
autophenomenology) that can be used as 
a tool for predicting and controlling the 
other - specifically: 
We must treat the noise-emitter as an 
agent, indeed a rational agent, who harbors 
beliefs and desires and other mental states 
that exhibit intentionality or 'aboutness,' 
and whose actions can be explained (or 
predicted) on the basis of the content of 
these states. (CE 76-77). 
As intentional systems, bestowed with 
a self-similar (to the hetero's) experience of 
"reality" through acts of self-projection, the 
hetero holds a limited sense of "rationality" 
for her research subjects.2o 
Method. The epoche, as the auto's 
main method, is taken to be a self-evidently 
effective tool that allows investigation into 
the world-constructing essence of being: 
Every opinion about 'the' world has its 
ground in the pregiven world. It is from this 
very ground that I have freed myself 
through the epoche; I stand above the world, 
which has now become for me, in a quite 
peculiar sense, a phenomenon. (Crisis §41) 
Responding to Heidegger's Being and 
Time, the auto recognizes the background 
that orients her epoche (the main 
methodological tool), yet still maintains its 
efficacy.21 
For the hetero, her method is just that 
of modem science coupled with a 
predictive strategy. The determination of 
the efficacy of this approach is left to the 
normal means of the scientific community.22 
Attitude towards realism and the 
lifeworld. What kind of realism about the 
lifeworld do each of these projects entail? 
The world,for the auto, is a fundamental 
realm of life before objective science in the 
form of a structured horizon. "The world is 
pregiven to us, the waking, always 
somehow practically interested subjects, 
not occasionally but always and necessarily 
as the universal field of all actual and 
possible praxis, as horizon." (Crisis §37) 
The hetero, on the other hand, views 
the world as "the objective, materialistic, 
third-person world of the physical sciences" 
(Stance 5). This view is coupled with the 
pragmatic / productive holistic intentional 
strategy in an ironic use of the 
Wittgensteinian insight into forms of life to 
overthrow significant dialogue. It must 
always be remembered that "deviation from 
normal interpersonal relations is the price 
that must be paid for the neutrality a science 
of consciousness demands." (CE 83) 
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Gadamer's Hermeneutic Critique of 
Interpretive Method 
When we follow the trajectory of 
thought from HusserI to Gadamer, we find 
a common theme and purpose. Each turns 
from the objectifying tendencies of 
modernity in search of a more satisfying 
account of Being - each building upon the 
former while responding to the post-
Nietzschean episteme (incredulity towards 
tradition) that marked the thought of the 
20th century and continues to influence 
philosophical dialogue. In this section, I 
develop an account of Gadamer's thought 
in relation to this arch of discourse and see 
if we can be justified in finding satisfaction 
in his onto-linguistic hermeneutics. To that 
end, it will be necessary to gain some 
understanding of Heidegger's use of the 
phenomenological method in explicating 
Being, as Dasein, and language - not to 
develop a criticism, but to better understand 
what Gadamer is hoping to achieve. After' 
outlining his thought, I will briefly entertain 
some criticisms of the linguistic idealism 
that Gadamer's hermeneutics suggests and 
explore whether or not Gadamer attends 
to the influence that society has on 
discourse - as has been highlighted by 
critical theory. I will then tie together these 
thoughts to show that the tum from 
modernity to language is not, at core, anti-
anything in orienting towards Heideggarean 
phenomenology. On the contrary, the 
suspension of awe before the positive 
methodology of the scientific program 
is urged by the need not to destroy or 
to leave it by the wayside but rather by 
the need to develop a wider, more 
pluralistic (vs. dichotomous) account 
of humanistic understanding. 
It is reasonable to see Heidegger's 
working-out of Dasein, in part, as an 
attempt to recover the most useful parts of 
HusserI's phenomenology. HusserI, in 
grounding knowledge in a transcendental 
subjectivity via the phenomenological 
epoche, hoped to avoid what he saw as 
naIve objectification in Enlightenment 
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thought. This move towards a 
transcendental subject, however, does not 
lead to a satisfactory understanding of 
Being; in fact, as we have already seen, the 
positing of the solipsisticly situated self in 
HusserI's reduction ultimately opens an 
unbridgeable void between the subject and 
the bracketed community of Others out in 
the life-worId.23 That he noticed the 
shortcomings of the methods of modernity 
and attempted to reconcile them with the 
"ineffable" aspects of consciousness is of 
great importance. Unfortunately, his desire 
to ground knowledge in an ultimate 
foundation (and to develop an a priori 
science of phenomenology) led to other 
problems that make questionable the 
extent to which we can be satisfied 
with his conclusions. 
Heidegger points out that this 
solipsistic move is a result of anxiety -
that is, the natural stand-point is but one of 
the possibilities that is open to the self -
being-in-the-worId as 'fallen' - focusing 
on the stand-point (constituted by the drive 
in objectification), and thus causing the 
inauthenticity which gives rise, ultimately, 
to individuating anxiety (BT §40). 
Heidegger took the results of HusserI's 
phenomenological investigations and shed 
light not only on the limiting (inauthentic) 
nature of the reductive method (a 
narrowing of focus) but also on its 
contextual (and historical) aspects. 24 
In Being and Time, Heidegger brings out 
the "fore-knowledge" - the backdrop, so 
to speak - the historical nature of 
essentialism, of which HusserI's 
phenomenology serves as crown, in some 
regards - in his criticism of Enlightenment 
inquiry. Interpretation, in this account, 
comes into playas explication rather than 
self-projection; i.e., "meaning" only makes 
sense in specific contexts and against a 
holistic background of shared, pervasive 
practices. The possibilities open to Being 
for understanding in the worId are more 
wide-open than that allowed within the 
consciousness of modernity (the 
consciousness of rational, eidetic 
dichotomies). It is in a temporal act, rather, 
that meaning becomes possible: 
In interpreting, we do not ... throw a 
'signification' over some naked thing which 
is present-at-hand ... when something 
within-the-world is encountered as such, 
the thing in question already has an 
involvement which is disclosed in our 
understanding of the world ... (§32) 
Before any conceptualization, before 
any knowledge, there is a "fore-ground", a 
"fore-structure", a "fore-knowledge" that 
makes the act possible. Husserl's self-
criticism failed in this regard. We become 
aware, after Heidegger, that the 
transcendental subject is not possible 
without the bracketed life-world.25 
Through his critique, Heidegger brings 
out the two very important points from 
which Gadamer departs: 1) the fore-
structuring of experience - Dasein as the 
"historical being" and 2) the possibilities of 
being in time (over and against anxiety)-
both of which together have made 
Enlightenment thought (or any, for that 
matter) possible. We cannot, however, 
break out of the 'circle' of our 
understanding to attain the God's eye view 
of the metaphysician - the "independent 
standpoint of the observer". In fact, it is 
within the circle that meaning lies: 
What is decisive is not to get out of the 
circle but to come into it in the right way 
.. .in the circle is hidden the positive 
possibility of the most primordial kind of 
knowing ... our first, last, and constant task 
is never to allow our fore-having, fore-
sight, and fore-conception to be presented 
to us by fancies and popular conceptions, 
but rather to make the scientific theme 
secure by working out these fore-structures 
in terms of the things themselves. (§32) 
The difficulty in "securing" this, 
however, lies in trying to develop an 
account that does not make any universal, 
trans-historical claims. This, in a sense, is 
what all of the thinkers after Husserl have 
been dealing with - trying to balance, on 
one hand, the problematic nature of 
foundationalism that highlights the need for 
a reassessment of positive methodology and 
metaphysical inquiry with, on the other, the 
contradictions we run into when, in the 
light of this reassessment, we try to support 
in some way any claims we may make, 
without resorting to essentialism. 
Gadamer, while hoping to avoid 
Heidegger's claims of goal-driven 
methodology, emphasizes the historical-
linguistic ground of Dasein in his working 
of hermeneutic consciousness. Whereas 
Heidegger saw language as but one of the 
possibilities of Being, Gadamer places 
Being and understanding fully in language 
- thus bringing together Heidegger's two 
themes (the fore-structure and open 
possibilities of being) in the space of 
discursive activity. Language, in this 
account, is the fundamental mode of 
operation of our being-in-the-world and the 
all-embracing form of the constitution of 
the world (Reader, 111) and the goal of 
hermeneutics thus becomes to reconnect the 
objective world of technology, which the 
sciences place at our disposal and 
discretion, with those fundamental orders of 
being that are neither arbitrary nor 
manipulated by us, but rather simply 
demand our respect. (111) 
The world, for conscious being, is an 
endless linguistic creation, the instantiating 
source of which lies in our shared traditions 
and 'prejudices'. 26 It is in this tum to 
language that he hopes to find safety from 
any methodological (ahistorical) claims. 
So, just what is contemporary hermeneutics 
(as opposed to traditional)?27 As Gadamer 
works it out in his essay "Hermeneutics as 
practical philosophy", it is, at base, an art 
of understanding that moves beyond 
methodology - and so we have to come to 
see hermeneutics as a "dimension of human 
ability ... [having] to do with what is each 
individual's due as a citizen ... " that 
inevitably comes out of practice (327). 
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Acknowledging the historical 
consciousness (wirkungsgeschichtliches 
bewusstsein) as the base of the linguistic 
"space" of discourse, so to speak, 
Henneneutics can designate a natural 
capacity of human beings ... it refers to the 
human capacity for intelligent interchange 
with one's fellows. (328) 
This interchange builds upon 
Heidegger's notions of the situated, 
temporal consciousness - in a way, 
fleshing out his ideas with the body of 
language. The relation between the self and 
other that was severed in Husserl's 
transcendental subject - the relationship 
between self and a discursive text - is 
now reconnected in an understanding of 
their inextricable co-dependence - down-
playing the autonomy of the Western self 
(the "I", the Dasein). 
The purpose of developing some of our 
ideas about the universality of this 
linguistic space is, as Gadamer states in the 
forward to the second edition of Truth and 
Method, not to prescribe "what we do or 
what we ought to do" but rather to bring to 
light "what happens to us over and above 
our wanting and doing" (339). Through 
henneneutic inquiry, Heidegger's 'circle' of 
understanding is never ending - non-
teleological spirit that is worked out further 
through discourse when the depth of being 
is brought to light, escaping reduction to an 
object of knowledge. This escape from the 
"leveling" of modernity, Gadamer feels, is 
the "universal human task" -
Genuine speaking, which has something to 
say and hence does not give prearranged 
signals, but rather seeks words through 
which one reaches the other person ... 
(Reader, 121) 
When we leave behind the inherited, 
written tradition (Weitersagen) - we make 
a move to disarm anxiety (significance of 
life, etc.). 
We can question Gadamer about his 
commitments in this seemingly linguistic 
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idealism, however. To vouchsafe 
knowledge in universal discourse seems, in 
a sense, to be a step backwards. Gadamer 
would respond to this, not with a counter 
argument, but rather an appeal to our 
understanding of language. The move to 
solipsism is not possible, he would contend, 
in light of the fact that "there is absolutely 
no captivity within a language" -
discourse is the on-going creative act that 
makes experience possible (Reader, 120). 
This assertion does carry its own weight in 
Gadamer's conception of Being-
"Language goes beyond the consciousness 
of the speaker and is in this respect more 
than a subjective behavior" (Foreword, 
348). To cry idealism is to misunderstand 
the goal of henneneutics - the 
broadening-of-horizons. 
On the other hand, we can criticize 
Gadamer for not attending to the insights 
of the critical theorists and Foucault's 
analysis of the role of power in discourse. 
It seems that he is a bit of an optimist, in 
that he supposes (necessarily) that all 
individuals will pick up the torch of 
humanism (and human solidarity). The 
only consolation (to counter this criticism) 
would be to consider the play of power to 
be an element of the discursive creation of 
being that is at a level less abstract than the 
articulation of henneneutics itself, deferred 
to latter discussion; although critical theory 
is a tonic in many ways, we must still 
return to the question of why just such an 
orientation towards power structures in the 
body of language is refreshing to our 
sensibilities. A Gadamerian conception of 
prejudice may possibly overcome 
Enlightenment ideals that still lie donnant 
in our post-Marxean episteme. 
Gadamer's henneneutics is responding to 
the shortcomings of Husserl and the 
suggestions of Heidegger in an attempt to 
liberate Being from categorization and 
'mechanization' (to use Gadamer's word). 
In the spirit of Derrida's differance, 
Gadamer suggests that liberating "play goes 
beyond the consciousness of the player and 
is in this respect more than subjective 
behavior" (Foreword, 348).28 Gadamer is 
attempting to open a space for ethical self-
creation after-modernity; i.e., he is 
attempting to prevent conversation from 
degenerating into inquiry, into a research 
program, not to eliminate the role of 
scientific inquiry.29 Science is not ultimately 
discarded, but rather 'put in its place' as a 
non-final arbiter of 'reality'. Gadamer has 
not given us a thorough system of inquiry 
or universal-schematic metaphysical 
account. Rather, through the eye-opening 
hermeneutic move, he has given us ideas to 
help broaden the closed horizon of the 
world of Enlightenment thought in which 
we labor and to open our ears to the 
unclosed, non-teleological, "infinite 
dialogue [that] is opened in the direction of 
the truth that we are" (Reader, 120). 
Conclusion 
For some readers sensitive to holism, 
the hermeneutic ideas developed in this 
essay will strike either a positive or 
negative chord. This gut-reaction lies at the 
heart of an important split in philosophical 
discourse surrounding holistic conceptions 
of language. While Dennett relies on some 
holistic view of understanding and dialogue 
as support for the intentional stance, 
hermeneutics also relies on a practical 
holistic conception of interpretation and 
understanding. As we have seen, however, 
each view has a different orientation 
towards its interlocutor, the other in 
communication. The heterophenom-
enologist builds theories, the hermeneutist 
seeks significance and self-unfolding. 
Theory-building and methodological 
inquiry are not, as such, futile endeavors, 
however; I do not make this claim. On the 
contrary, the linguistic ability to support 
alternate modes of explanation is central to 
the nature of our being. In the Fregean 
tradition, we still engage in dialogue. 
However, the positivistic intent and 
orientation that support its "success" in tum 
lead to "deviation from normal 
interpersonal relations," as Dennett 
willingly concedes. 
In the essay "Holism and Hermeneutics," 
Hubert Dreyfus elucidates a distinction 
between practical and theoretical holism 
that further highlights the inadequacy of 
methodological studies of consciousness. 
Viewing interpretation as translation 
between theories and understanding as an 
epistemological problem, the theoretical 
holist is guided by the Heideggerian 
concept of vorsicht - our conceptual 
schemes. The practical holist, in contrast, is 
sensitive to our vorhabe - the totality of 
our cultural practices. She views 
interpretation as explication; i.e., meaning 
arises only in specific contexts and against 
a background of shared practices that are 
not theorizable because they are pervasive 
and involve skills (6-7). This distinction 
leads Dreyfus, after considering the role of 
non-technological micro-practices of Being 
in understanding, to argue that the human 
sciences are incommensurably different 
from the physical sciences: 
[S]ocial science might, indeed, 
establish itself, only ... by leaving out the 
social skills which make the isolation of 
features or attributes possible. But such 
skills and the context of everyday practices 
they presuppose are internal to the human 
sciences, just as the laboratory skills of 
scientists are internal to the history and 
sociology of science, for if the human 
sciences claim to study human activities, 
then the human sciences, unlike the natural 
sciences, must take account of those human 
activities which make possible their own 
disciplines. (17) 
The theoretical holism developed by 
Richard Rorty, a view that supports and is 
most closely aligned with Dennett's 
intentional stance, does not attend to this 
distinction.30 Furthermore, Kogler has 
argued persuasively that Dreyfus' practical 
holism itself puts one in an untenable 
ethnocentric situation.31 Addressing the 
shortcomings of practical and theoretical 
holism in dealing with power structures in 
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dialogue (e.g. ethnocentricity and social 
structures), Kogler has developed a broader 
conception of henneneutic competence 
(acknowledging the role of empathy in 
understanding) that incorporates both 
aspects of holism and strives to overcome 
the deficiencies of these approaches in 
understanding consciousness in his work 
The Power of Dialogue and more recently 
in his lecture "Language and the Paradigm 
of Perfonnativity". All of these holistic 
variants hinge on the examination language 
and on a conception of dialogue as the 
basis for inquiry and explication of the 
human condition and consciousness. 
Having considered the human sciences 
in general, I will close with a discussion of 
the positive implications for 
heterophenomenology and other similar 
efforts in cognitive science regarding the 
limited and misguided nature of interpretive 
methodological inquiry. Dennett's work, as 
a case study for cognitive science and as a 
bridge between the analytic and continental 
strains of philosophical thought, has mainly 
served as a vehicle to launch our 
discussion. If research in cognitive science 
is to continue while maintaining sensitivity 
to the insights of post-modern visions of 
language, how will it refonnulate its goals? 
What is the future role of cognitive 
science? In discussions with Professor 
Kogler, I have considered possible 
technological worst-case scenarios 
involving artificial intelligence (AI). As in 
the case of old science fiction, the future 
usually seems better (or worse) than it 
actually turns out to be. Artificial 
intelligence will continue to be a 
technological handmaiden to objectifying 
inquiry - work in cognitive science and its 
offspring will go on as long as the dialogue 
of psychology continues. When I began this 
study a year ago, I was strongly against the 
idea of AI; my instinct was reactionary. In 
the course of thinking and reading about 
henneneutics and the philosophy of 
language, I became deeply involved in an 
internal dialogue, in effect internalizing a 
dialogue within our Western tradition. I 
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breached a broad area of knowledge 
fonnerly unknown to me and basked in the 
beauty of ideas finely interwoven and then 
wove my own thread - this essay. 
Through the exchange of ideas, I 
discovered the true value of my Liberal 
Studies work. Dialogue, in whatever fonn, 
can not be denied; it leads to outward 
growth, occasional retreat and refonnation, 
and to the discovery of significance and 
meaning in a lifeworld populated with so 
many fresh other voices. The ethical 
consequences of methodological inquiry in 
the human sciences will be balanced by a 
growing awareness of multiculturalism and 
holistic discourses that mark the beginning 
of our new century - marked with the 
promise of a grand continuation of the 
dialogue of humankind. 
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